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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiffs
vs.

and

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and
GORLINSKI,

Defendants

Appellees,
ROBERT

and

Appellants,
>Case No. 7825

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,

Cross-Plaintiff

and

Appellant,

VS.

!

EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,

Cross-Defendants

and

Appellees.

A P P E L L A N T S ' P E T I T I O N FOR RE-HEARING

The above named Appellants respectfully petition
this Honorable Court for a re-hearing of the appeal in
the above entitled action and in support of this petition
represent to the Court that the opinion rendered by it in
1
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this cause and filed with the Clerk of said Court on
February 2, 1953, fails to consider and pass upon the
principal critical and vital issue involved in this action
and in addition assumes the existence of certain facts
which are not proved by the record but are entirely
disproved by it.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The opinion concludes with this paragraph:
"It thus appears to us that when the original
location was made on the Armstrong placer claim
and patent was issued therefor, all lodes described
in the patent and paid for became the property
of the patentee, and the southern 135 feet of the
placer claim remained open to the public for lode
claim filings; and when the Cora lode claimant
filed on this ground, he was entitled to all of the
lode which apexed within the fifty feet of surface
rights awarded to him by his patent, and he had a
right to follow the ore beyond the sidelines to
the limits of the ore body. Thus was segregated
from the public domain all of the iron ore body
contained within the forty-acre placer claim; and
when the plaintiff through purchase bought both
the Armstrong placer and the North 135 feet of the
Cora lode, it secured title to all of the iron ore
within the forty-acre tract, and there was nothing
for Justheim and Gorlinsky to file upon."
It is therefore a fair statement that the opinion is
fundamentally based upon the assumption that the
patent to Thomas R. Jones conveyed to him the mineral
deposit within the "conflict area." The opinion also
assumes that the mineral deposit APEXED within the
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fifty foot strip (Tract A) awarded to Jones by the patent
and that the "dip" is in a westerly direction.
It is the contention of Appellants that these three
a'ssumptions, wholly unjustified by the record, have lead
the Court to an erroneous conclusion and entitles the
Appellants to a re-consideration by the Court of its
decision and opinion. In these particulars the Appellants' contentions will be hereinafter emphasized.
L
THE PATENT TO THOMAS E. JONES SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE PART OF CORA NO.
1 LODE CONTAINED WITHIN THE CONFLICT
AREA, EXCEPT TRACT A.
The Appellants in their opening Brief, pages 33 to
36, and in their Reply Brief, pages 1 to 14, have set forth
their reasons for the above contention. The opinion of
the Court entirely ignores this contention, although it
clearly implies that if the Jones patent did not convey
to him that part of the mineral deposit within the "conflict area" (except Tract A) that the Appellees obtained
no title to same and that such area remained part of the
public domain open to location by Appellant Justheim.
It is believed by Appellants, with all due respect to the
Court, that the contention of Appellants set forth above
is worthy of serious consideration and decision. It is
vital for a correct determination of the issues in this case
for the Court to construe and pass upon the grant of the
Jones patent.
3
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The Court evidently adopted the decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court in Mt. Rosa Mining, Milling and
Land Company v. Palmer, 26 Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176, as
the basis of its judgment without considering the difference in the facts between it and the instant case. Appellants in their briefs cited and relied upon that part of
the Mt. Rosa case which authorized Justheim to enter
upon the "conflict area" and make the Lucky locations.
It exculpates him from the charge of being a trespasser.
At page 16 of Appellants' Keply Brief, Appellant's were
very careful to indicate their use of this decision.
Appellants refer to pages 11, 12 and 13 of their
Reply Brief and respectfully ask the Court to read the
same again because therein set forth is the distinction
between the facts of the Mt. Rosa case and the instant
case. Appellants repeat the following statement in their
Reply Brief, page 12:
"There did not intervene in that case (Mt.
Rosa) a patent to the lode claims which defined
the rights of the lode claimants. In the instant
case there is the Jones patent which definitely
•sets forth the extent of the grant to Jones. The
terms of the Jones patent cuts across the factual
field and distinguishes the instant case from the
Mt. Rosa case, and makes the rule of that decision
inapplicable to the instant case."
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

If Appellants' construction of the Jones patent is
correct, viz., that it specifically excluded that part of
the mineral deposit upon which the Lucky Claims are
located then the Mt. Rosa decision can have no bearing
on the case. On the other hand, if the Jones patent does
not exclude the part of the deposit in the "conflict area"
upon which the Lucky Claims are located then the rule
of the Mt. Rosa case is applicable. In view of this situation Appellants respectfully insist that they are entitled
to a definitive interpretation and construction of the
Jones patent and assert that the absence of such interpretation produces a decision without legal substance or
•support and based solely on an assumption that the Jones
patent conveyed to him all the mineral deposit within the
"conflict area."
If the Court will give due and proper consideration
to the Jones patent Appellants believe it will reach the
conclusion that the patent specifically excluded that part
of the mineral deposit within the "conflict area" upon
which the Lucky Claims are located. Appellants have
discussed this facet of the case at length in their Keply
Brief and will not burden the Court with a repetition of
the same.

n.
THERE IS NO APEX OF THE MINERAL DEPOSIT WITHIN TRACT A AND NO EXTRALATERAL RIGHTS ATTACHED TO TRACT A.
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Attention is invited to the testimony of the Appellees' witness Dr. A. Lee Christensen set forth at pages
49 to 61 of Appellants' opening Brief and also the testimony of Earl F. Hansen, Appellee's' witness, set forth
at pages 39 to 49 of Appellants' opening Brief. The testimony of these experts deny that this mineral deposit contains any apex. To quote Mr. Christensen:
"* * # I don't think that ore body has a well
defined strike or dip. I don't think it is a plane
surface." (Page 56 Appellants' opening Brief.)
The colloquy between counsel and Mr. Hansen set
forth at page 43 of Appellants' opening Brief is interesting and material:
"Q. What would be your description of this
deposit ?
A. I confirm Dr. Christensen's general description.
Q. Well, then, I take it that the word 'apex'
in this kind of thing has no proper application?
A. That is my understanding of an ore body
which does not conform to planes.
Q. In other words, you could not get 'apex*
out of this case•? That is your theory?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your opinion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am using that, of course, in our general
understanding of practical mining law, but of
course this deposit would have strikes along the
long axis, wouldn't it?
A. It has a long demension. When we define
strike, it has reference to a plane and a dip to a
plane.
6
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Q. You say that condition does not exist!
A. No sir, both sides of that are warped
surfaces. They are not a plane, and they are inclined to be irregular."
Not only is that part of the Trial Court's finding 19
which declares that the discovery within "Tract A" lies
upon the apex of the lode or vein erroneous but also
Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 of the Trial Court erroneously
applied the law of extralateral rights to the deposit.
The Appellate Court fell into these errors in its statement quoted above to-wit:
<<* * * j j e [ j o n e s ] w a s entitled to all of the
lode which apexed within the fifty feet of surface
rights awarded to him by his patent and he had a
right to follow the ore beyond the sidelines to the
limits of the ore body."
Appellants in their opening Brief attack this finding
and these conclu'sions of law and in their Eeply Brief
reiterate their criticism of the same. (See pages 2 and
3 Appellants' Reply Brief.)
The Appellees, themselves, proved that the mineral
deposit involved in this action had no apex, no dip and
no strike. The Law of Extralateral Rights, based on
R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 26), authorizes the
locator or patentee of a claim to follow a vein or lode
throughout its entire depth where the top or apex lies
inside of the surface lines of the claim, although such
vein or lode may 'so far depart from a perpendicular in
its course downward as to extend outside of the vertical
side lines of the surface location. This extralateral right
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must be exercised on the "dip" of the vein or lode. (See
authorities cited pages 63 to 79, Appellants' opening
brief). The evidence, without contradiction, shows that
the deposit within Tract A is not a separate deposit
but is part of the deposit within the "conflict area," but
there is not a line of evidence in the entire record which
even suggests or implies that the direction of the "dip"
of the deposit is from Tract A in a westerly direction
toward the West quarter corner of Section32. This is a
secondary assumption of the Court's opinion, which is
clearly not sustained or supported by the evidence.
In the face of this proof, submitted by the Appellees,
it is difficult to believe that this Honorable Court will
sweep aside Appellants' contentions and simply settle
the issue by assumptions which have no basis or foundation in the proof. Appellants respectfully request the
Court to re-consider this aspect of its opinion because of
its extreme importance. They have demonstrated above
that title to the part of the mineral deposit within the
"conflict area" (excluding Tract A) did not pass to Jones.
If the Court upon reconsideration agrees with this conclusion it is respectfully submitted that neither as a
matter of law or of fact can it hold that extralateral
rights, as described by the Court in the quotation above,
attached to Tract A.
CONCLUSION
The vital and critical issue in this case is whether
Jones by his patent secured title to the part of the mineral
deposit within the "conflict area" upon which the Lucky
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Claims are located. If he did not then this area was part
of the public domain and open to location by Appellant
Justheim. The apex of the deposit is not on Tract A and
therefore Tract A carried no extralateral rights.
WHEREFORE, Appellants pray for an order of
Court granting them the privilege of re-argument and rehearing.
Respectfully 'submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER,
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
312 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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